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THE CAPACITY TO BE CONTENT:
Aspirations and Young Adult Catholics in Singapore
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Abstract 										
Drawing from interviews with young adult Catholics in Singapore, this article discusses
aspirations in terms of the capacity to be content. For my informants, the capacity to be
content has three aspects: the pursuit of happiness, the questioning of Singapore’s incessant
drive for economic growth, and the neglect of those left-behind. Taken collectively, these
nuances show that the aspirations of young adult Catholics are effectively a moral critique
of the social and economic state of affairs in the city-state. The capacity to be content
also informs these young adults’ decision to be involved in welfare activities or even be
employed in social work altogether. However, such moral critique’s potential to contest the
political status quo is tempered by the resounding opinion that religion and politics do not
mix in Singapore. It is precisely by interrogating this tension between their aspirations and
their views of the moral state of Singapore that this article is a contribution to this special
issue on Christianity and the nation in Southeast Asia.
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INTRODUCTION

On June 2, 2012, an estimated turnout of 600 people gathered at the Speakers’
Corner at Hong Lim Park to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Operation
Spectrum (Au “Hundreds Turn up at Rally against Arbitrary Detention”). In 1987,
several Catholic leaders and lay were accused of organizing themselves to topple
the government and detained without trial. Informed by liberation theology, their
social activism was found suspicious by the government, which branded them as
Marxist conspirators. As a result, some of them were detained for two or three
years, only to be released without having been formally charged. What was perhaps
even more painful for many Catholics was that Gregory Yong, then archbishop,
eventually withdrew his support for the accused.
Organized by former detainees, the rally called for the abolition of the Internal
Security Act (ISA ), which for them was repeatedly used to arrest – without formal
trial – individuals deemed threats to national security. They argued that the ISA
had been abused to quash suspected political dissidents and thereby discourage
protests in the name of social harmony (see Republic of Singapore). In the end, this
ideology of social order has secured the long-lasting rule of the People’s Action
Party (PAP ) in Singapore. Michael Barr makes the case that whether or not the
Marxist conspiracy was real did not matter to Lee Kuan Yew, then Singapore’s Prime
Minister. He argues that Operation Spectrum was meant to set the precedent for
an authoritarian rule that “would outlast his premiership” (360).
Interestingly, news leaked that prior to the 2012 rally, Nicholas Chia, the
immediate past head of the Catholic Church in Singapore, allegedly sent the
organizers a letter supporting the event and its message. But after having been
summoned by government officials, Archbishop Chia sent a formal note to the
organizers asking for the withdrawal of his initial letter. Lauding this decision was
the government which commended the archbishop for recognizing the “complexity
of our multi-racial, multireligious society, and the need to keep religion and politics
separate” (Ministry of Home Affairs).
The incident has led many Catholic Singaporeans to turn to social media to
express their dismay. To many, this was a bitter reminder of how the government
clamped down on the Catholic Church to weaken the local impact of democratization
around Asia in the 1980s (D. P. S. Goh). Many took Chia’s decision, for one, as a
repeat of the withdrawal of support by the Church for the accused Catholics in
1987. Waipang Au, who runs a well-read blog, has asserted therefore that “the
church has a responsibility to atone for the wretched way it abandoned its own
priests and lay workers 25 years ago” (“Lunch Menu a 4-Point Letter”). In many
online forums, commentators have turned his critique on the government’s take on
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harmony. Many of them think that social harmony can only be upheld with truth,
integrity and justice. Commentators have also bravely suggested that when none of
these values are present, social unrest is to be expected.
These accounts show that even if they constitute only 7% of the Singaporean
population (up from 5% in 2000), Catholics can still be perceived as a potential
threat to the political regime (Department of Statistics, Census of Population
2010 ; Department of Statistics, Census of Population 2000 ). It is not because they
are religiously active and can therefore have other institutional loyalties. The
perception of threat could very well emanate from the historically liberal slant of
Catholicism in Singapore until it was effectively overrun by the massive growth
of Pentecostalism since the 1980s (D. P. S. Goh). In addition, Catholicism has a
record of political involvement around the world, notwithstanding its role in the
democratization of neighboring Philippines (Youngblood).
As will be recounted below, the Catholic Church and even other Protestant
denominations have been historically involved in various efforts at social justice
(D. P. S. Goh). Taken suspiciously by the state, Christian churches and agencies
have a record of organizing workers and the homeless in the country. In this sense,
the participation of Catholics in the anti-ISA rally in 2012 may suggest that even if
social activism may have been deafened by the loud prosperity gospel of Evangelical
megachurches (Chong, “Megachurches in Singapore”), the liberal aspiration for
social justice lingers on.
In this paper, however, I turn my attention to young adult Catholics and draw
from my interviews with them to suggest that this liberal posture now takes on a
different form. In contrast to the literature (see Chong, “Filling the Moral Void”;
Mathews), my interest is neither in the institutional responses of the Church nor
the organized activities of Catholic agencies in addressing social needs. By looking
at their personal aspirations, it appears that the activism demonstrated by their
Catholic peers above is rather isolated.
My informants, as will be seen, have an aspiration to be “happy”, a word I
repeatedly heard during the interviews. At the same time they question the
merits of what they consider as Singapore’s incessant drive for economic growth,
which has “left behind” many others like the elderly and the working class. Taken
together, these ideas unravel the aspirations of many young adult Catholics today
in the form of their capacity to be content. In this manner, the article also shows that
whereas the concept of aspiration has been typically discussed in the literature in
the form of material achievements or social mobility, its local understanding can
be substantively different (see Poole and Cooney).
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But the potential of this aspiration to effectively contest the political status quo
is limited. This is where they largely differ from historical depictions of Singapore’s
Catholic activist. Whereas Catholicism in Singapore is perceived by the state to be
a potential threat to political order, my research with young adult Catholics shows
that many of them would rather maintain the distinct line between politics and
religion. In other words, their capacity to be personally content, while serving as
a moral critique of Singaporean society today, also reinforces the state’s desire to
keep religion out of politics.
METHODOLOGY

This article draws from one-on-one interviews with young adult Catholics in
Singapore, who are broadly in their 20s. In total, I interviewed 33 informants in
2012-2013. I note that the findings in this paper draw from a bigger project on
Christianity, young adulthood, and aspirations in Singapore where I conducted
more than 70 in-depth interviews with respondents from the Catholic Church,
Evangelical megachurches, and traditional Protestant denominations. This paper
focuses only on my Catholic respondents, a significant bloc of Christianity in
Singapore that has been largely overlooked by recent studies. Ensuing publications
will tackle the others and their aspirations.
The snowball approach was adopted for this research. I contacted initial
interviewees through the help of various networks and parishes, which was a
deliberate effort to avoid favoring a particular Catholic demographic. Efforts were
made too to accommodate Catholics of different social and economic backgrounds.
As young adults, many of them have finished post-secondary education in
Singapore and are now establishing their careers. But I made sure that the breadth
of informants I had was wide based on ethnicity, career, the parishes they come
from, and even their level of religious involvement.
My informants are predominantly Chinese but I made an effort to include
Singaporeans of Indian, Eurasian, Malay, and even Chinese-Filipino descent. In
context, 52.7% of Catholic Singaporeans are Chinese, 8.8% Indians, .6% Malays,
and 19.5% from other races (Department of Statistics, Census of Population 2010).
Several converts have also been interviewed although they seem to constitute only
a fraction of the Catholic population. Roughly 1% of the Catholics surveyed in 2007
were undergoing the conversion rites, for example (Catholic Research Centre).
Some of my informants are active in youth or young adult ministries but some
others are sheer Sunday Mass attendees.
Hence, I met and interviewed Catholic informants with varying profiles in
different locations around the city-state. Overall, the interviews have been rich
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as my young adult informants also come from different fields such as education,
charity, healthcare, engineering, finance, and various government agencies. I
have, for example, interviewed a recent female psychology graduate in one of the
private rooms of a local parish, which she could access as a member of their young
adult community. Sometimes, the informants themselves were very hospitable. I
interviewed a male engineer in his own flat in the western part of the island state.
Most of the time though my interviews took place in local coffee shops after office
hours. For example, I interviewed a 28-year-old male researcher working for a
youth-related government agency in Jurong East’s library cafe.
Given its research design, the paper does not claim generalizability with
regard to its conclusions. Nevertheless, these findings are helpful in nuancing the
diverse experiences of young adult Catholics, a segment which, while a minority,
is significant in Singaporean society. For one, young adult Singaporeans belong
to a generation that has benefited from universal access to education and the
general affluence of the economy (Ng). By growing up in the 1990s and 2000s,
they did not undergo the social transformations that their parents did in terms of
housing, public infrastructure, and the nature of governance itself. Their overall
wellbeing has also been supported by the sustained growth in Singapore’s Human
Development Index since 1990, placing the country 18th out of 187 (UNDP ). This
novel generational context has implications on their aspirations for themselves
and their society. A recent study, for example, shows that secondary school
students, depending on the quality of their education, can already articulate
critical perspectives toward democratic participation in Singapore (Ho, Sim and
Alviar-Martin). In other East Asian economies, this interest in the aspirations and
“life-making” strategies of young people is an emerging area of inquiry for the social
sciences (Anagnost, Arai and Ren 2). Secondly, Christianity is implicated in the
social mobility of young adult Singaporeans. It is worth noting, for example, that
the remarkable conversions to Christianity, especially among the English-educated
Chinese, are explained by the rationality and relevance of the religion to their lives
(C. K. Tong). Apart from this intellectual appeal, Christianity in Singapore “shares
many social characteristics with cosmopolitanism” such as the ability to speak
English, be globally connected through religious networks, and living in private
properties (R. B. H. Goh 11). It is notable that almost 60% of Catholic Singaporeans
are in professional, executive, and administrative occupations (Catholic Research
Centre). Finally, young adult Catholics are an interesting demographic to consider
in terms of their religiosity. Catholics in Singapore are generally religious, with
80.5% of the population attending Mass every weekend (Catholic Research Centre).
Although still considerably high, the lowest percentage (72.5%) is among those in
their 20s when compared to other age groups.2 At the same time, this same age
group would show that religion has a strong influence on personal life, with more
than 77% disagreeing with the statement “I think Christ’s teachings/religion do
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not influence my day to day decisions” (Catholic Research Centre 34). In other
words, although they may not be as collectively present in church as the other age
groups, they are not necessarily withdrawing from Catholicism. In fact, as will be
seen below, their understanding of Catholic faith mainly informs their aspirations.
Overall, the interest in young adult Catholics is called for. Research on Christianity
in Singapore, however, is mainly on Protestants and Evangelical megachurches
whose growth in recent decades has been dramatic (Chong and Hui; D. P. S. Goh;
C. K. Tong; J. K. C. Tong; Cornelio, “New Paradigm Christianity and CommitmentFormation”; Chong, “Megachurches in Singapore”).
CHRISTIANITY, STATE, AND ASPIRATIONS IN SINGAPORE

In this section I spell out the various ways in which Christianity can be
characterized as articulating or expressing its aspirations in Singapore. These
are the wider Christian contexts to which my informants are exposed. Much of
the literature draws from institutional action and the participation of Christian
churches or organizations in public life. These aspirations are one way or
another in relation to social change or causes. As Bunnell and Goh (1) put it,
religion has the potential – through rituals, narratives, and symbols – to carry
out “transformative performances of social aspirations, creativity and energy.”3 In
Singapore, Christianity has articulated its aspirations in at least three ways: as a
socially progressive institution, as a strategic partner of the government, and as
moral conscience. I discuss these one at a time.
Daniel Goh’s account of liberal Christianity in the decades following the
independence of Singapore traces the trajectory of social activism heavily
informed by liberation theology. Whereas contemporary Christianity in Singapore
is characterized by the spectacular growth of Evangelical megachurches known
for effectively marketing religious experience (J. K. C. Tong), many Protestant
and Catholic organizations in the 1970s and 1980s were concerned with issues of
social justice. Organizations such as Singapore Industrial Mission, the Christian
Conference of Asia, and Young Christian Workers focused on hunger and human
rights issues and even organized students and workers for social campaigns and
theological reflection. Challenging the state’s discourse of economic growth,
“social Christianity” articulated its aspiration by imagining “a suffering and hoping
Asia supplanting the developmental covenant of the nation” (D. P. S. Goh 74).”4
The state found this vision of a transnational working class threatening especially
in view of communist insurgency and democratization in neighboring countries.
In response, the state forcibly closed down many of these Christian organizations,
expelling even the international ones. As recounted above, the state’s response to
social Christianity became most decisive when activists were arrested and detained
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for conniving with communists to topple the government in the 1980s. In a manner
that is still felt today, the purported Marxist conspiracy has set the precedent that
has largely kept religious organizations from crossing the line with the government.
This situation poses a dilemma for Christianity, a religion with an expansionist
ethos. The drive for growth especially for Evangelical churches may directly
challenge the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA ), as other religions
may be offended by active proselytization.5 In response, the strategy of contemporary
Christian churches has been to engender a “flexible identity” (R. B. H. Goh 14). At
one level, many churches are seeing a bigger role at evangelism around Southeast
Asia. Singapore in this sense has become a center for the training and support
of missionaries around the region. At another level, many churches are forming
their own social arms involved in addressing the needs of the marginalized in
Singapore such as the elderly, out-of-school youth, and people with special needs.
By being flexible, Christian churches are able to recast their identity as socially
relevant institutions that aspire for the betterment of Singaporean society. Like
many Buddhist welfare organizations, they have become strategic partners of the
state particularly in the delivery of welfare services that the government is not
immediately keen to provide given its workfare policy (Poh; Kuah-Pearce). In this
sense, the Singapore state practices “accommodative secularism” (Thio 43).
Other studies see contemporary Christianity essentially as the conscience of
the state. In recent years, many Christian organizations have become worried
about what they see as the moral decay of Singaporean society over such matters as
sexuality and gambling, for example. This turn to personal morality is arguably a far
cry from the social activism of churches in the 70s and 80s. Perhaps this is another
palpable consequence of the clampdown on Christianity. But at the same time,
reinforcing the moral panic is the state’s perceived willingness to entertain morally
controversial decisions in the name of economic growth. With the establishment
of two integrated resorts with gambling as the main business (Marina Bay Sands
and Resorts World Sentosa), for example, many Christian churches have accused
the state as having lost its moral compass (Mathews).
Underpinning this is the general view that the state has increasingly relaxed
its preoccupation with other moral issues. In the wake of its independence, the
Singapore state, as Chong shows (“Filling the Moral Void”), was very strict and
morally conservative over sexual discipline concerning pornography, for example.
It was important at that time to assert the state’s traditional values such as “the
nuclear family unit” and the “generally patriarchal structures” which the state
feared Western individualism would undermine (Chong, “Filling the Moral Void”
572). In recent years, the discourse and actions of the state suggest a relaxation of
such conservatism, as signaled by the legal hiring of homosexuals in civil service,
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for example, or the statements of ministers that the repeal of the law criminalizing
sexual acts between men6 should be left to public debate (Chong, “Filling the Moral
Void”; Mathews). In response to these issues, prominent churches and religious
organizations like the National Council of Churches in Singapore (NCCS ) have
expressed their opinion against what they see as society’s moral decline. In other
words, the aspiration has been to uphold Singapore’s moral integrity. However, to
avoid being seen as crossing the political line, religious institutions have presented
themselves as “concerned citizens” offering “constructive help” (Mathews 61-62).7
In each of these cases, Christian organizations have shown that in contrast to
the fear that they may disrupt social order, they have become strategic in recasting
their role in Singapore society as a moral conscience or a strategic partner in welfare
service, for example. I have suggested that apart from being strategic to justify
their social relevance in Singapore, their actions also articulate their aspiration for
Singapore society with regard to its moral decay or concern for the marginalized.
All these aspirations, however, are articulated in the framework of institutional
Christianity in the form of Christian organizations, churches, or religious leaders
themselves. This angle is important if, as the studies above show, the main
interest is in how religious institutions have negotiated or even asserted their
place in Singaporean society (see Chong, “Filling the Moral Void”). Aspirations,
however, are not the monopoly of institutions. They may also be articulated in less
pronounced ways by religious actors whose views may not necessarily coincide
with the actions and statements of church leaders, for example. The literature
above has been generally silent concerning the aspirations of ordinary believers.
YOUNG ADULT CATHOLICS AND THE CAPACITY TO BE CONTENT

During my interviews I asked my informants questions on what they thought
were Singapore’s biggest problems, their own aspirations for society, and what the
Catholic Church can do in fulfilling these aspirations. In this sense, I approached
aspirations, which are future-oriented imaginings, in terms of subjective ideas or
yearnings as to how Singapore can be a better place. These are personal aspirations
in relation to society.
To ask these questions about society is how I am appropriating Arjun
Appadurai’s (67) view that aspirations are ultimately about “the good life, about
health and happiness,” which are essentially future-oriented ideas informed by
socially shared values. But these ideas are clearly about the self, often inflected
with notions of social mobility. Hence, the practical interest in the literature is in
widening the poor’s capacity to aspire through expanded life opportunities (Ray;
Brown; see also Nathan). Capacity denotes the dispositions of groups of people to
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imagine and navigate the future relative to “real-world conjectures and refutations”
(Appadurai 69). In other words, the capacity to aspire is both a disposition and
navigational skill given limitations and opportunities. Finally, my interest in
subjective aspirations is different too from some recent studies that have focused
on the public manifestations of aspirations in the form of rituals, performance, and
urban planning, which may be driven by organized individuals or the state itself
(Bunnell and Goh; van der Veer; see also Cornelio, “Global and Religious”).
In my interviews, what has surfaced is that instead of aspiring to achieve
prosperity or greater economic affluence, the aspirations of my informants is for
Singapore to simply be content or satisfied with life. In other words, the capacity is
not to achieve but to be content. Such capacity to be content has three dimensions:
economic, personal happiness, and the concern for those that have been “left
behind,” a phrase I heard repeatedly. Overall, this capacity to be content among my
informants stands in contrast to notions of social mobility and also the activist tone
of moral militancy and clamor for social justice of Christian institutions discussed
in the literature.
On economic growth
For a city-state that has prided itself as an economic miracle and one of the most
globalized economies in the world (“Singapore Ranked Third Most Globalized
Economy”), I find it intriguing that many of my informants problematize the fetish
for economic growth in Singapore. More intriguing are these statements because
they come from young adults in considerably lucrative careers.
Martin, 29, is a project engineer at Singapore Power who went to reputable
schools in the country. Dressed casually and clearly from work, Martin
introduces himself as he meets me at the façade of Novena Church. We settle
for a table at the end of the hallway, avoiding the flux and noise of evening Mass
attendees. Martin describes himself as a “pragmatic” individual, having chosen his
engineering degree well and planning promptly for his wedding next year. He also
believes that “progressive” values concerning abortion and gay rights need to be
taken “pragmatically” with respect to the values of the majority. He backs down,
however, when I ask him about how Singapore can be a better society: “Maybe
the government can be less pragmatic sometimes. Maybe it’s time to think about
welfare some more…I’m not saying that we totally become a welfare state and give
up on economy. I’m saying that sometimes, if we cannot hit 4% growth, let’s just
take 2%. It doesn’t matter.” Martin then carries on to explain that welfare should not
be treated as an expenditure that can arrest the sustained growth of the economy.
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“Of course it’s good to have a lot of money, but if all you need is, say, SGD 5,000 for
a functional family – or country for that matter – then just live with SGD 5,000.”
In a section above, I mentioned that Singapore’s workfare policy is a conscious
move against European welfarism for fear of dependency (Thio). For Martin and
many other informants, this move has led the state to overlook the fact that there
are other sectors in society that need to be addressed, for which they appeal to the
Catholic Church instead. This concern for the marginalized will be tackled in the
next section. For now, what needs to be highlighted is this apparent discontent over
what my informants perceive as the state’s fetish for economic growth. Indeed,
this is what Lin, 26, admits to me. A female charity worker for people with special
needs, Lin believes that “we’re placing too much emphasis on growth and having
the best. We have a lot of things which our neighboring countries don’t have.”
The views of my informants concerning Singapore’s obsession with economic
growth is not without basis. Success defines the very identity or “self-scripting” of
Singapore as a city-state that began without any natural resources to bank on (Chua
31). For a state that started out as a survivalist in the 1960s, it is no wonder that
Singapore is now perceived as model for many emerging economies in Asia. Now
that Singapore has become very successful, the state is compelled to continuously
re-imagine its future (Ban). The result is that the state is in a mode of “perpetual
renovation” of its national identities (Chong, “Fluid Nation” 504). Indeed, to be a
global city in terms of technology, finance, and education is now the ambition of
Singapore, in a manner that figuratively expands the horizon of the small island
(Sidhu, Ho and Yeoh; Ban).
However, this emphasis on economic growth is problematic for my informants
for various reasons. Lin carries on to explain that the danger of this emphasis lies
in affecting the mindset of Singaporeans. For her, Singaporeans merely want “more
and more and more, and will never be satisfied. As a result, other things are being
sacrificed like relationships and family ties.” Lin then points out that Singapore
society may “break down” as family and marriage are being “sacrificed,” thus “a lot
of children are getting hurt.” The welfare of children clearly matters to Lin as she
regularly interacts with special education students. Kristoffer, who works for a
polytechnic institute, tells me, too, that in spite of the service-learning component
his office is introducing for character formation, “I am still cautious… because at
the end of the day Singapore’s policies are still very economic. As long as people
focus on money, all our efforts will be overridden as our students will just want to
acquire more money.”
For my other informants, the state’s drive for economic growth is behind the
many other social problems of Singapore such as higher cost of living and the
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influx of many foreigners. These are issues that have been repeatedly raised by my
informants and reinforced in the media as well (see Snodgrass). Leila, 25, works for
one of the offices of the Archdiocese in Singapore. She explains to me that while
Singaporeans are taught to be competitive in the labor market, she and many of her
friends merely want to “keep a decent, comfortable life, yet we really have to work
quite hard.” Her work has exposed her to concrete cases of “people making ends
meet” such as the elderly and working class breadwinners. More importantly, this
is a personal concern for her as she is getting married very soon. Furthermore, the
drive for economic growth and be a global city explains Singapore’s dependence
on foreign workers. This situation poses a policy dilemma in that the influx of
foreigners has challenged the state’s desire to foster a sense of nationalism among
its own citizens (Chong, “Fluid Nation”). The situation became more acute in early
2013 when the government released a highly controversial White Paper spelling
out its goal of increasing its population to 6.9 million by 2030 by welcoming more
immigrants to fill in various needs (Hodal). Online and offline, protests have been
staged against the said White Paper and my informants have also expressed their
opinions about having “too many foreigners” in Singapore. While the motivation for
immigration in Singapore is economic, my informants have repeatedly pointed to
the feelings of locals. Corinna, 29, was a secondary school teacher before deciding
to become a PhD student in psychology at a local university: “Sometimes when I
go out, I’d be surrounded by non-Singaporeans on the MRT ...and I’d be wondering,
like, am I really in Singapore?...I don’t think it’s an issue that foreigners are coming
to work here but I think there should be a limit.” I press Corinna to explain this.
She responds by problematizing the rhetoric of the state: “You can argue that
Singapore is an immigrant society but you have second or third generation locals
who do not feel that they are immigrants anymore. To think that the government
wants Singaporeans to feel like they belong in Singapore and to love and take care
of the country.”
On Singapore’s left-behind
My interviewees have also repeatedly mentioned their concern for those who
have been “left behind” by Singapore’s relentless drive for economic growth. This is
a point that came alongside their aspirations that Singapore – its state and citizens
– should rethink the drive for the greater acquisition of wealth. As seen above,
some of my informants have already mentioned the unintended consequence of
leaving people behind. In this sense, the concern for the marginalized is the other
side of the coin that problematizes Singapore’s economic drive.
Here I suggest that this social awareness and concern is a relevant aspect of the
capacity to be content. In contrast to the drive to be competitive and successful
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in Singapore, to be content compels my informants to see whether anyone else
is falling behind. On several occasions, young adult Catholics would talk about
a range of cases of marginalization from the elderly who still work at hawkers’
centers to struggling families living in dismal conditions seemingly unimaginable
in Singapore. While many of these narratives are based on their observations, many
others are also drawn from personal experience. Philip, one of my first interviewees,
leads a Catholic youth organization involved in social service. He recounts that
some years ago, he and his friends visited an estate of one-room rental flats for the
elderly where they saw “a lot who could not even speak English. Only their Chinese
dialects like Hokkien and Teochew. For a lot of them, they are sort of just waiting to
die because there’s nothing they can turn to…We realized maybe they had fallingsout with their families years ago and now their children have forgotten them also.”
In another interview, Jacklyn, 28, recounts one case she had to face in her
present job dealing with different schools. One student was harshly sanctioned for
tardiness without the school conducting proper investigation. She soon found out
that the child’s mother, who is the breadwinner of the family, has to care for her sick
husband and mother as well. The boy is then left to fend for himself but because of
the scolding, Jacklyn says he is now traumatized and might “fall through the cracks”
for fear of going back to school. The mother earns only SGD 1,000 a month, an
impossible wage given Singapore’s cost of living.
Much of the sentiments above resonate with recent findings concerning
inequality in Singapore. In the past decade alone, the gini coefficient rose to a
staggering .48 (Hui). In fact, wages for low-paying jobs have even diminished while
cost of living in Singapore has dramatically increased. Arguing for minimum wage,
Hui notes that Singapore’s reliance on foreign workers has led to wage depression
and the inability of low-wage workers to cope with risings costs. Indeed, many of
my informants have pointed to the influx of foreigners in Singapore as a major
problem. As Leila puts it in a seemingly helpless tone, Singapore “is getting more
and more crowded.” Some of them have complained about mundane irritations
such as different accents and languages they hear on the MRT . But others have
personally experienced being at a disadvantage. Philip shares with me that as a
polytechnic graduate, he was expecting an already dismal salary. But because of
competition with foreigners, he realized that companies would offer him an even
lower rate. He then admits that “those who have just finished their diploma in poly
going out to work are getting a bit disillusioned.”
Contrary, however, to discussions on the internet (see G. Goh), the responsibility
for inequality in Singapore is not being laid on foreigners only. I picked this up
when I met another polytechnic graduate, Derrick, 27, who works as a safety officer
for a construction company. He explains that the state has “moved away from
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addressing the basic needs of people” and that it has fostered “a mentality that if
you’re smart, then only you get a good job…They’ve left too many people behind
who feel inadequate about themselves.” I then ask Derrick whether he himself has
experienced being left behind. Putting down his Subway burger, Derrick admits
to me that “well, I never liked studying. I tried my best but never got good grades.
Today I do get by so I’ll say I’m one who’s trying to catch the bus…I’m trying to get
on it by getting at least a stable job…I’m not aiming for a car or a condominium,
just my basic needs.” Having decided to propose to his girlfriend, Derrick shares he
needs to have a career plan to support his family.
The discussion so far begs two important questions. First, what are the boundaries
of this social concern? In the illustrations above, the concern seems to be mainly for
Singaporeans left behind by the system like the elderly, orphans, and working class
families. But does the concern for the “left behind” also include migrant workers?
The picture is not entirely clear. On one hand, as mentioned above, some of my
informants are critical of foreigners in Singapore insofar as they are perceived to
dominate the place with implications on the use of public utility and overall quality
of life. For some informants, it is an economic issue but for some others, the influx
of migrant workers is an affront to their cultural and national integrity. On the
other hand, there are also parish-based ministries dealing with the condition of
migrant workers like domestic helpers and construction workers. There are young
adults involved in these affairs and some of them have expressed their reservations
about recent anti-foreigner sentiments. As I walked him to his bus stop, Kristoffer,
for example, has suggested that these sentiments are very “selfish” in not realizing
that these foreigners are also in need. I also have other informants who disagree
with the harsh sanctions on bus drivers from China who not too long ago staged a
strike to protest their working conditions in Singapore (see Neisloss).
Second, to what extent are Catholic Singaporeans directly involved in social
action. In the course of my fieldwork, I came across many informants who have
been involved in various activities or organizations dealing with the marginalized
in Singapore. Some of my informants, like Philip, are also serving as leaders in
these communities. In a way, being involved is not difficult to accomplish in
Singapore as there are various volunteer welfare organizations that may also be
in partnership with religious institutions (see Lai). The Archdiocese has a vast
network of lay groups and apostolates that are socially engaged. Only 47.8% of
Catholic Singaporeans, however are involved in “Church activities, ministries or
service” (Catholic Research Centre 19). In context, the volunteerism rate of young
people in Singapore (15 to 24 years old) is relatively lower at 36% (National Youth
Council).
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On happiness (or the lack thereof)
To escape the heat of the afternoon sun, Cherie and I agree to head straight for
the McDonald’s nearby as soon as we meet at Bukit Gombak MRT station. Upon
seeing her, I immediately know that Cherie could perhaps be one of the most
enthusiastic interviewees I have met in Singapore. Typically, it would take me some
time to establish rapport before my interviewee opens up. Indeed, as soon as we
find a relatively quiet corner, Cherie, dressed in a white blouse, readily shares her
life story with me – including considerably private accounts of her life growing
up in Singapore. This seems natural given Cherie’s career in financial consultancy.
For her, it is after all about “building long-term relationships.” Her personality has
surely brought her a long way. Only in her late 20s, she was recently awarded as one
of the top consultants of the year in the country.
But it has been an arduous journey for Cherie. When she was much younger,
she experienced working as an outdoor sales promoter, a factory worker, and finally
as a cleaner in a hawkers’ center where she felt “very sad every time I look at the
uncles and aunties.” She admits that she did not grow up in an affluent family but
is thoroughly proud of her father who gave up an opportunity to work abroad so as
not to be away from the family. In the end, her father became an electrician, earning
only a meager wage. “You know how when we are young we like to compare with
our friends? When I went home and told this to my father, he actually scolded me.”
She found his sacrifices thoroughly endearing but it was his terminal illness that
drove a lesson home for her:
When I went to the ATM to withdraw money I saw that I was only left with SGD
33.00. And I had to give money to my parents and the worst thing is that I had to act
like nothing happened. Otherwise they would have been worried. I then realized that
fathers, no matter how poor they are, they won’t say anything. They can give and give but
we won’t know because we don’t see. Last time I thought my father was useless because
I didn’t see him doing any housework, but through my experience I saw that, woah, he
had a tough job.

So in spite of the recent success in her career, Cherie has learnt to appreciate
relationships more than money. She insists that “I don’t want my family to be worse
off when I pass away.” But this insistence comes with a personal caveat: “Before I
came to this job, I was telling myself and my boss that I did not want to be seen
as being materialistic. Because in this line, people are materialistic and moneydriven. I don’t want that. I don’t want that at all.” Cherie then admits to me that
all this is because of her family. It is unfortunate that her father soon passed away.
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Cherie’s view of materialism then informs her critical attitude towards the
economic drive of the State. “I guess the government is only working towards
money. You see like how sudden they can build the integrated resorts…They are
not listening enough to people and there have been so many studies that these
will increase social problems – especially with those with families in Singapore.”
Cherie here refers to the controversial integrated resorts that were resisted by
many Singaporeans, especially conservative Christians (see Mathews). In the end
these projects – Manila Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa – have proceeded
and are now important landmarks of Singapore’s fast-changing cityscape. Cherie
concludes: “So yeah, there’s a lot of unhappiness especially among people who care
for the society.”
This seeming pervasiveness of “unhappiness” among Singaporeans has been
repeatedly raised by my informants. In a way, this observation is not surprising
given the contemporary concerns of many Singaporeans over housing, cost of
living, and palpable overcrowding in public places, issues which became prominent
during the 2011 General Election. Tambyah and Tan are therefore right in saying
that these issues undercut the overall happiness of Singaporeans given the citystate’s other economic achievements. I would, however, suggest that these findings
by Tambyah and Tan are specific bread-and-butter irritations not to happiness
per se but to the general quality of life in Singapore. In many studies concerning
happiness, quantitative indicators have typically dealt with well-being, for example
(see Selin and Davey). These are irritations insofar as the state has established its
authority and credibility not just through authoritarianism but also the successful
delivery of social and physical infrastructure that the population has enjoyed and
continues to expect from the state. After all, success is inscribed in the very core of
the state’s identity (Chua).
In contrast, my research surfaces more fundamental and enduring conditions
that have left my young adult informants thinking seriously about their own
happiness. Cherie’s account above demonstrates its potent source: the ongoing
economic drive of Singapore. The state’s economic drive, as mentioned above,
has become a compelling narrative even for Singaporeans to fashion their own
successes. Instrumental here has been the championing of meritocracy and success,
ideas I will revisit later (K. P. Tan; Chua). I ask Corinna, 29, about the importance
of the 5Cs in her life. The 5Cs represent what was considered the Singapore Dream
especially in the 1990s: cash, credit card, car, condominium, and country club
membership (“Singapore’s Sm Goh Reinvents ‘Singapore Dream’”). Having worked
as a schoolteacher for five years, Corinna, 29, points out that “it’s not that these are
not important, but they should not consume me to the extent that I lose sight of
what it is that makes me happy.” Is she then happy? “Yes, I get to do what I want
to do, so I am living without any regrets.” Leilah’s disappointment with her friends
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from junior college confirms this: “It’s sad when I ask them if they are happy…They
will be like, ‘oh we just got our flat and we’ll be getting married in two years, and
we can sell the flat again after five years to move to a bigger one.’ And I’m like, ‘but
are you happy? What do you want to do with your life?’” Leilah now works for one
of the agencies of the Archdiocese, helping out in the religious formation of young
Catholics. I have also interviewed many others who are employed in the field of
social work, charity, and welfare in Singapore. Many of them agree that while they
know that they will not be considered successful, they are “happy” to be where they
are.
These accounts are arguably directly implicated in the previous two sections.
In a way, the aspiration to be happy can be considered the core of the capacity
to be content. In being critical of Singapore’s drive for economic growth and the
perceived neglect of the marginalized, my informants are also saying that being
personally happy is what is being taken for granted by many Singaporeans. From
Corinna’s accounts and the many others above, the contours of the aspiration for
happiness among my informants is readily discernible: the centrality of family and
relationships and the opportunity to lead a meaningful life. In other words, being
happy is not only about being surrounded by friends or the quality of life in terms
of welfare or their health, ideals characterized as happiness in a recent study on
youth in England (Savage et al.).
THE CAPACITY TO BE CONTENT AS MORAL CRITIQUE

The aspiration to be happy coupled with a critical view of Singapore’s economic
drive and concern for the left-behind can be collectively considered as my informants’
capacity to be content. To be content, for many of them, is about finding satisfaction
with what one already has and where one is while questioning what they consider
as the mindless pursuit of affluence, as exhibited by the state and even some of their
own peers. In this sense, the capacity to be content is at once about themselves
and also society at large. Here, it is quite revealing that their aspiration is not
simply about having a “successful career” or earning “lots of money,” life goals
considered “very important” by Singaporean youth (15 – 19 years old) (National
Youth Council 11). These findings tend to be in contrast too to some recent studies
on Protestant Christianity in Singapore. A recent survey shows that megachurch
Christians overwhelmingly value money and material blessings (Chong and Hui).8
While financial stability and other bread-and-butter concerns may also crop up
in the interviews, my informants have more readily and openly raised the points
above and followed through with personal stories and explanations why being
content matters. In fact, some of them have also resisted what they perceive as the
prosperity orientation of megachurches. Without restraint, Corinna even thinks
that some of these churches are “money-making enterprises.”
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Moral critique

The capacity to be content, of course, does not mean that they have abandoned
any ambition to become successful in their respective careers. As the narratives
above show, they are employed in various industries, some more lucrative than
the others. Many of them are also involved as volunteers in parish-based or
community organizations, while others are employed in social work. The common
denominator among my informants is that the capacity to be content is an aspiration
that characterizes the good - or ethical - life given what they are seeing in Singapore
society today. Whereas aspirations are orientations that allow individuals to
navigate their future, they are ultimately about “ethical and metaphysical ideas”
(Appadurai 67). This underpinning is also implicit in Nathan’s point that aspiration
is “a higher-order concept” that must orient individuals’ capabilities and needs (40).
In this sense, the aspiration to be content is an ethical critique of what many of my
informants see as Singapore’s general drift. That it is a critique is well articulated by
the young adults. Martin, an engineer who went to top schools in Singapore, offers
interesting reflections that are at once emotional and insightful: “Old people fall
through the cracks. The less fortunate fall through the cracks. Those that are not
productive to society fall through the cracks. The greatest strength of Singapore,
which is its economy, is also its greatest weakness…It makes me sad.” Explaining
himself, Martin mentions the everyday realities in Singapore that other people, for
him, may be taking for granted. “You go to the coffee shop, you see old women
cleaning tables…You go to Tiong Bahru and you see one-room flats with an old
couple…waiting to die. No one to support them…I really sometimes question why
we as an advanced country, still have these situations.”
Such reflections among my young adult Catholic informants seem to resonate
with the increasingly loud sentiments against elitism especially among the
marginalized in Singapore. For Kenneth Paul Tan, the value of meritocracy, which
guided the selection of government leaders and rewarded educational achievements,
has evolved into a brand of elitism that has engendered a class of Singaporeans
perceived to be oblivious to the “losers” who have become “more skeptical about
their own prospects for upward mobility” (273).
In the end, the capacity to be content – the aspiration for happiness and the
care of the left-behind – is in itself a critique of the state of affairs in Singapore.
Admittedly, at one level, it is an individual disposition informed by their Catholic
socialization. For example, Jacklyn, 28, discloses that “my faith really shapes my
values a lot. Sometimes I feel like an outsider because my Christian values really
contradict the world. In my previous company, they were always ‘we need more
profit.’” This is not surprising since 86.2% of Catholics (20-29 years old) agree or
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strongly agree that “religion plays a key role in most aspects of my life” (Catholic
Research Centre 36). It is of course possible that these aspirations are informed by
various discourses such as other religious thought (including Buddhism), ideologies
of opposition parties, secularism, and even liberal education. But it matters that
Catholicism is a minority religion in Singapore, which could explain the strong
sense of identity among its followers. This affinity is reflected in my informants’
narratives especially when they consider the influence of their faith on their own
values.
But at another level, the capacity to be content is not only a personal aspiration.
One can see that as a moral critique, the capacity to be content has subtle resonances
with the Catholic Church’s drive for social justice before Operation Spectrum (see
introduction above). Social Christianity, as Goh characterizes churches in the ‘70s
and ‘80s, organized the marginalized especially in emerging industrial areas in
Singapore. Their social and pastoral efforts manifested their major concern for the
suffering in Singapore, namely the working class, foreign workers, and the poor. By
highlighting their conditions of suffering, they effectively challenged “the dominant
national narrative and developmental ethos” of the state (D. P. S. Goh 58).
The limits of the capacity to be content
But such capacity has its limits. As a moral critique, the capacity to be content
captures both the aspirations and sentiments of young adult Catholics concerning
themselves and their society. But its potential to contest the political status quo
that sets the state’s economic agenda is tempered by my informants’ views of the
role of religion in the public sphere. As Shane, a sports nutritionist, curtly puts it,
“religion and politics do not mix in Singapore.” And some of my informants are
aware of their own limitations in trying to effect change. While some would want
the Catholic Church to be more vocal about political matters, they are the first
to admit too that “even if you riot and voice out your concerns, it cannot change
much.” Kristoffer, a former youth coordinator in his parish, admits too that “the
government has succeeded to keep us in our own sphere lah. We’ve not engaged
society enough. We only chat about our own problems.”
In this sense, the capacity to be content, while seemingly noble and laudable
for contesting social excesses, misses out on the transformative potential of
aspirations as “the human driving force for change” (Bunnell and Goh 1). Indeed,
one of the lasting consequences of the clampdown on Catholic activists in the
1980s is that church leaders have consistently restrained their own ranks from
making sensitive statements that could be used against them on grounds of stirring
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political controversy (E. K. B. Tan). Recounted above, the circumstances involving
Archbishop Chia and the anti-ISA rally in 2012 clearly demonstrate this.9
But perhaps part of the problem is not simply their acceptance of their political
powerlessness but also the passive acceptance of the benefits of the status quo.
Some of my informants have repeatedly mentioned the convenience of living in
Singapore they believe other countries cannot match. Shane, who believes that
religious organizations do not have a role to play in influencing Singapore politics,
also confesses that he is “very proud of how safe it feels especially at night,” a clear
nod to the security mechanisms of the regime. Emilia, who works with the youth
for a government unit, also tells me “I’m grateful that because there is such control,
I’m living happily.” She admits this to me after expressing her disappointment with
how the government has intervened in the recent Archbishop Chia affair.
In view of these nuances, the potential of the capacity to be content to inform any
lasting political change in Singapore is arrested. In other words, the state’s economic
drive and the political regime that has crippled the participation of religion in the
public sphere, while fostering a critical attitude among young adult Catholics, has
also cultivated their modes of passive acceptance of the status quo. In this sense,
I argue that this hesitation is part and parcel of the capacity to be content. To be
content where one is includes accepting one’s political powerlessness in Singapore.
Potentially buttressing this view, I would suggest, is also how my informants
understand their Catholic faith. I pick this up from Leilah who concedes “I don’t
know how much the church and Catholicism can help the whole of society. I think
at most we can, you know, groom individuals who will one day make the change.”
Here she mainly implies personal values. Parrying my question on politics, she
also does not think that “we must vote for X just because the church told us so.”
Agreeing with Leila would be Emilia, who sees herself as “just a small individual”
who cannot change “anything in particular.” This is even more intriguing given that
Emilia finished a degree in political science. When I ask her to explain her view,
Emilia draws from “the Catholic virtue of being content…I mean, I did not choose
where I want to be born and things like that, so whatever has been given to me, I
will just be thankful and live with it, you know?”
To me, the Catholic difference becomes more glaring in view of the apparent
militancy of other (Protestant) Christian churches that have been vocal in serving
as the moral conscience of the state (see Mathews). As discussed above, many
Christian churches and their leaders have officially expressed their objections to
such issues as homosexuality and the feminist agenda of AWARE (see above). The
aspiration of these institutions has been to uphold the moral integrity of society
which, they believe, the state has also been willing to compromise especially if
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decisions are justified with economic benefits (Chong, “Filling the Moral Void”).
The controversial approval of the integrated resorts and their casinos is a major
case in point.
CONCLUSION

This article has drawn on the views of young adult Catholics in Singapore
concerning their aspirations. In doing so, the paper has broadly addressed two
areas of research. First, the aspirations of my informants demonstrate that they
do not have to be about achievements or social mobility, as is often discussed in
the literature on aspiration and on Singaporean society in general. Indeed, the
capacity to be content is about themselves as it is about Singapore insofar as it is a
moral critique of the state’s incessant economic drive which to them has an effect
on people’s overall happiness. Put differently, in contrast to aspirations inflected
with social mobility, the capacity to be content in fact questions the seemingly
relentless drive for economic expansion by the Singapore state. For many of my
informants, this has led to current social issues that include overcrowding (which
has rendered the migrant worker as a glaring threat), the willingness of the state to
compromise its morality (welcoming gambling as an enterprise), the disregard for
the marginalized (workfare policy), and the drive for wealth acquisition among the
population (that has fostered pervasive unhappiness).
Second, investigating the aspirations of young adult Catholics offers a
counterpoint to the extensive studies on Christianity in Singapore. Much of the
attention, for example, has been given to institutional forms of Christianity and
their official responses to pressing issues in the city-state. From these studies,
Christianity is seen as either having historically taken a liberal posture to uphold
the dignity of the marginalized or serving as the moral conscience of the state in
recent years. Such institutional acts demonstrate the aspirations of Christianity
in Singapore. My research, however, locates itself in the subjective aspirations of
young adult Catholics.
This research raises a few questions concerning young adult Catholics and
aspirations. I mentioned at the onset, for one, that having been born in the 1980s
and 1990s, their generation has benefited largely from the general increase in the
affluence of the economy and citizens. Chong has rightly suggested that the state
can no longer expect its population, especially the young who are increasingly
exposed to cosmopolitan values and other sources of news, to be completely
passive to the political situation in Singapore (“Introduction”). This is perhaps a
valid statement to make in the light of recent elections that have seen opposition
parties take seats in the parliament.
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But perhaps what needs to be considered, too, is to what extent highly educated
young adults can drive such changes. My informants, many of whom come from
the middle-class, are expected to care about security and order which some of them
believe can be preserved, as their nuances above show, if religion is kept away from
the public sphere. I have therefore argued above that the other side of the capacity
to be content, for all its noble desires, is about accepting the current political order.
Here, I agree that this attitude can be emanating from their middle-class location.
Indeed, judging by their real estate properties and occupations, Catholics in
Singapore are by and large from affluent backgrounds (Catholic Research Centre).
To test this proposition, the importance and influence of socio-economic status
must be probed in greater detail in future research.
Above I also mentioned that some of my informants are drawing from their
Catholic faith to articulate their capacity to be content. This disposition has also
included acceptance of the political status quo, which seemingly runs counter to
their critical attitude toward the Singapore state’s economic drive and perceived
neglect of the left-behind. There is a caveat, however. Inasmuch as the Church is
perennially perceived by the state as a compelling threat to political order, as in the
case of the recent Archbishop Chia affair, many of my informants do not see any
greater role for the Catholic Church in the public sphere. In this case, the vocal
sentiments from many Catholics against Chia’s perceived withdrawal of support
for the anti-ISA rally in 2012 may not necessarily reflect general feelings, at least
on the part of my informants. The pervasiveness of such views especially across
different generations of Catholics needs to be studied. To me, the pastoral intent
of the recent survey administered by the Catholic Church in Singapore can be
even more effective if political views and aspirations are also included (Catholic
Research Centre; Williams).
I do not deny that the capacity to be content is an aspiration that serves not
simply as a moral critique, but also a potential driving force for many of them to
be involved in welfare or other forms of depoliticized social engagement. What
this also means, however, is that the capacity to be content, inasmuch as it is a
moral critique of society, is in itself a highly privatized - or depoliticized - religious
development. After all, being happy is about valuing family and relationships and
pursuing meaningful lives. Given Singapore’s politics and brand of secularism, this
individualistic attitude is very much welcome (E. K. B. Tan).
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Notes

1. I am thankful to the Singapore Pastoral Institute (now the Office for the New
Evangelisation), the Society of Jesus in Singapore, and the Asia Research
Institute for their institutional support during my fieldwork in 2013 – 2014.
Some preliminary findings were presented at a public lecture I delivered at
the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Malaysia Sabah and at a seminar at
the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in
Göttingen, Germany. I am thankful to my colleagues for their very helpful
feedback.

2. A similar trend is reflected in a longitudinal study involving Catholic young
adults in the US see Christian Smith and Patricia Snell, Souls in Transition:
The Religious and Spiritual Lives of Emerging Adults. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009.
3. Such institutionally expressed aspirations are not unique to Christianity. See,
for example, Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce, “Delivering Welfare Services in Singapore:
A Strategic Partnership between Buddhism and the State.” Religious Diversity in
Singapore. Ed. Ah Eng Lai. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and
Institute of Policy Studies, 2008 for an account of socially engaged Buddhism.
See also Jayeel Serrano Cornelio, “The Nationalization of Religion: Cultural
Performances and the Youth of Soka Singapore,” MMG Working Paper Series
13.17 (2013).
4. For a comparative take, see Jin-heon Jung, “Some Tears of Religious Aspiration:
Dynamics of Korean Suffering in Post-War Seoul, South Korea,” MMG Working
Paper 12.19 (2012) for its discussion on suffering and the social activism of
minjung (grassroots) theology under military rule in South Korea in the
1980s. Many Christian churches were driven by the aspiration to see “political
democratization, social justice, and human rights” (Jung 29).
5. The Singapore state has largely viewed religious diversity as a potential threat
in itself especially in light of racial conflicts in the history of the nation. From
the vantage point of the state, therefore, religions are entities that potentially
breed “overarching fear and vulnerability “that necessitate ‘close scrutiny,
interventionist surveillance, and ultra-sensitivity to perceived threats’” (E.K.B.
Tan, “Keeping God in Place: The Management of Religion in Singapore” 59). As
a result, legislation like the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA )
and the Internal Security Act (ISA ) have been promulgated and used to counter
perceived insurgency and extremism.
6. Section 377A of the Penal Code of Singapore
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7. The strategies, however, are not always perceived as such. The collective action
of the members of the Church of Our Savior (COOS ) to take over the Association
of Women for Action and Research (AWARE ), a women’s rights group, became
controversial as religion was accused of overstepping its boundaries with the
state. Driven by a desire to correct what they thought was the organization’s
focus on “the promotion of homosexuality and lesbianism,” the new AWARE
officers soon had to step down due to increasing pressure from old members
and even state ministers themselves (Chong, “Introduction” 2).
8. For example, compared to 55.4% of Anglicans and 62.1% of Methodists, 79.4%
of megachurch Christians “agree” or “strongly agree” that money is important
to them (Chong and Hui 69). Catholics are not included in their study. My next
project will tackle the aspirations of young adult megachurch Christians.
9. Other religious organizations have recast their roles in society by partnering
with the state in addressing welfare gaps, for example Kuah-Pearce, “Delivering
Welfare Services in Singapore: A Strategic Partnership between Buddhism and
the State.” The unintended consequence of this is that religious entities become
coopted or even “nationalized”, a point made in Cornelio, “The Nationalization
of Religion: Cultural Performances and the Youth of Soka Singapore.”
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